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
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US COMBAT FORCES IN
SUPPORT OF PACIFICATION



LESSON LEARNED NO. 80.

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UNITED STATES MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND, VIETNAM
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MACJ3-052

29 June 1970

SUBJECT: Vietnam Lessons Learned No. 80: US Combat Forces in
Support of Pacification

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FOREWORD

1. (U) The purpose of this Lessons Learned summary is to document and analyse the various programs and operational techniques used by US combat forces when in support of pacification.
2. (U) Since the term "pacification" is rather encompassing and is used in different ways, it is appropriate to include the definition as stated in the Combined Campaign Plan, 1970.

Pacification: The military, political, economic and social process of establishing local government responsive to and involving the participation of the people. It includes the provision of sustained, credible territorial security, the destruction of the enemy's underground government, the assertion of political control and involvement of the people in government, and the initiation of economic and social activity capable of self-sustenance and expansion. The economic element of pacification includes the opening, securing and improving of lines of communication important to economic and military activity.

3. (C) While all operations conducted by US combat forces ultimately support pacification, many units are now directly involved in the pacification process. As Vietnamization continues, more US units may be assigned the pacification role. While some combat units, notably those in the III Marine Amphibious Force (MAF), have been engaged in pacification type missions for several years, this role is a relatively new one for most US forces. This summary presents to the newcomer tested concepts, procedures and techniques that will more readily ensure success when the pacification mission is assigned.
4. (U) It is recognized that one of the primary missions of US combat forces in Vietnam is the conduct of military operations against North Vietnamese Army/Viet Cong (NVA/VC) main force units. These military operations against enemy units are indispensable to pacification since they establish the essential secure environment necessary for political, economic and social programs to flourish. However, the war in Vietnam is "one war", a trinity of efforts composed of pacification operations, the modernization and improvement of RVNAF and combat operations against enemy main forces.

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US COMBAT FORCES IN SUPPORT OF PACIFICATION

1. (U) Introduction. The basic concept and objectives of pacification, to defeat the VC/NVA and to provide the people with economic and social benefits, have changed little since the first comprehensive GVN plan was published in 1964. Successive annual plans improved military - civil coordination and refined definitions, roles and missions. As Free World Military Assistance Forces (FWMAF) increased their presence and military operations, it became apparent that military forces were to become a necessary part of the pacification process. As a consequence, joint military planning, in coordination with Government of Vietnam (GVN) agencies, resulted in the Combined Campaign Plan, 1967. This plan established, for the first time, definite pacification missions for the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) and the FWMAF. ARVN's primary responsibility was to provide the military support to pacification while the FWMAF sought out and destroyed VC/NVA main force units, base areas and lines of communication (LOC).

a. The GVN influence continued to spread as military operations increased and territorial forces improved their capability. Now, under the current 1970 campaign plan, ARVN units are emphasizing combat operations against enemy main forces while territorial forces assume more and more of the local security role in areas undergoing pacification.

b. Specific pacification policies, principles, goals and standards are detailed in the GVN Plan for Pacification and Development, 1970. This plan tasks government agencies and subordinate headquarters to prepare supporting plans and to establish specific goals down to the province level.

2. (U) Concepts and Objectives.

a. Pacification plans involving military, political, economic and sociological programs are being implemented throughout Vietnam behind the security shield of the FWMAF and Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF). Combat operations to eliminate the enemy are clearly essential but they are not sufficient in themselves. Sustained security in the countryside and the introduction of reforms are necessary to establish those conditions favorable for further growth and stability and are just as important as combat operations. Pacification is a means to achieve the support and participation of the people which are of course vital to the defeat of the enemy and the expansion of a viable government.

b. To orient the reader as to the specific aims of the pacification program the following objectives, as stated in the GVN Plan

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for Pacification and Development, 1970, are briefly outlined:

- (1) Territorial Security. Provide security as a prerequisite for rapid social, economic and political development.
- (2) Protection of the People Against Terrorism. Neutralize the VC Infrastructure (VCI) and expand law and order. The GVN anti-VCI program is called "Phung Hoang" and the US counterpart program is called "Phoenix."
- (3) People Self Defense Force (PSDF). Perfect the organization, training and equipment of these forces to increase their capability of protecting the villages and hamlets.
- (4) Local Administration. Establish a viable, efficient local government representing the people and capable of self-development.
- (5) Greater National Unity or the Chieu Hoi Program. Increase Hoi Chanh, or ralliers, to the GVN. Train and rehabilitate returnees so they may return to a normal life within the GVN national community.
- (6) Resettlement of Refugees. Maintain and resettle refugees so they can participate in local economic development in a secure environment.
- (7) Information Program for the People. Provide wide dissemination of the GVN policy and educate and motivate the people to participate in government programs.
- (8) Economic Advancement (Prosperity for All). Enhance local economic development and improve social, health, and education conditions.

c. These objectives will be discussed in greater detail and related to the roles and missions of US combat forces in Vietnam.

3. (C) Pacification Programs and Techniques Employed by US Combat Forces.

a. The following paragraphs describe and examine some of the programs and projects being conducted by US combat forces in support of pacification. Successful and effective techniques are identified for possible use by other forces under similar conditions. Pacification is a complex endeavor; the coverage of techniques and methods here is not intended to be exhaustive but only to indicate the main aspects of pacification support operations. The broad aspects of pacification and a variety of conditions pose a continuing challenge

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to the individual's imagination and resourcefulness in the development of new and successful innovations.

b. Of the eight goals outlined in the GVN pacification plan, US combat forces have concentrated, and been most effective, in the areas of territorial security, upgrading of territorial forces, anti-VCI operations and civic action projects.

c. The following paragraphs outline major pacification programs and highlight some of the successful techniques and guidelines developed by US commanders.

4. (C) Territorial Security and the Upgrading of Territorial Forces.

a. The Combined Action Force. The earliest and one of the most successful US territorial security programs is the Marine Combined Action Force, CAF (formerly the Combined Action Program).

(1) Concept. The primary purpose of the CAF is to provide sustained village security and to create a sense of trust in the Vietnamese government. Basic to the concept of the CAF is the integration of a squad of Marines with a PF platoon to form a Combined Action Platoon (CAP) which functions under the operational control of the local district chief. The CAPs are assigned specific areas for operations (AO) which are compatible with their mobility and resources. With a relatively small AO and constant movement, the CAPs soon acquire an intimate knowledge of the terrain and the people. Inherent to CAP is the concept of mobility, the infantryman's mobility--slow, but quiet and effective.

(2) Organization. There are now 114 CAPs organized into 20 Combined Action Companies which in turn are organized into four Combined Action Groups. The company headquarters are generally located with district headquarters while the group headquarters are near province headquarters for more effective control and coordination. The CAP building block is the USMC squad. The squad leader, an M-79 grenadier and a Navy corpsman, combined with the PF platoon leader and his platoon headquarters group, comprise the leadership and support element of the CAP. The remaining Marines, consisting of three fire teams of four men each, are dispersed among the three squads of PF to form a completely integrated platoon. The Marines provide advice, training, encouragement and improved fire support for the PF while in turn the PF provide an intimate knowledge of the area, a rapport with the people and a source of intelligence that would otherwise be unavailable.

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(3) Missions. Along with the basic mission of combat operations, the CAP has the additional long range mission of creating the conditions whereby the PF soldier can carry out territorial security unaided. The Marines do this by training their counterparts, usually on a person-to-person basis, and by instilling pride, confidence and aggressiveness in the PF soldier. In addition to example and on-the-job (OJT) training, some formal instruction is conducted by the Combined Action Company in subjects such as night firing, forward observing and map reading.

(4) Operational Tactics and Techniques. CAP tactics follow three basic principles.

(a) In the conduct of aggressive patrols and ambushes around protected hamlets, the principle of tactical mobility is employed. The CAP does not use static or fortified defensive positions but rather establishes a screen of random ambushes and patrols, never in the same place twice or in a predictable pattern. Composition of CAP patrols is usually at a ratio of three PF to one Marine and normally not less than two to one. The constant movement makes CAP less vulnerable to surprise attack by superior forces and fosters enemy insecurity in the area of CAP operations.

(b) The second principle is the combining of minimum personnel with maximum firepower. The relative small size of the CAP is backed up by US and RVNAF reaction forces and available firepower which greatly increases its combat power and effectively utilizes the principle of economy of force.

(c) The third principle is that of credible permanence. Since the Marines are integrated into the locally recruited PF, they become known and identified by the villagers as part of the security force that will remain as long as they are needed. The stability and permanence of CAPs foster an involvement in all phases of village life and results in a rapport which is unique to most US combat forces.

(5) Command and Control. The collocation of the combined action company with the district operations center, and the close relationship this proximity provides, facilitates coordination, planning and execution. This is particularly true for artillery and other fire support. Command relationships within the CAP are on a coordination and cooperation basis. The USMC squad leader does not command the PF element nor does the PF platoon leader command the Marines. The role of the Marines in CAP is that of advisor and assistant to the PF soldier and thus, all CAP activities are mutually planned and executed. Whenever possible, maximum PF participation is encouraged.

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(6) US Personnel Selection and Training. A major factor which can be attributed to the success of CAP is the selection and training process for CAP personnel. In view of the special nature and requirements of the CAP program, all personnel are screened to insure adaptability and that they meet stringent personal and military standards. Upon selection, they attend a two week course at the CAP School, Danang. The school provides instruction on general military and Vietnamese subjects, the latter covering the Vietnamese language, history, culture and politics.

(7) Results.

(a) By living and operating at the hamlet level, the CAPs have played a major role in denying the VC his source of manpower, food and intelligence. CAP operations have created an atmosphere of security and stability wherein the overall goals of pacification can be achieved.

(b) From the inception of the Combined Action Program to the present, 93 combined platoons have attained the required degree of security within their assigned areas and the Marine element has been withdrawn for relocation to another hamlet and CAP.

(8) Problem Areas.

(a) Inevitably, conflicts do arise among the members of the CAPs. Such conflicts are of course minimized by personnel selection and the fostering of common understanding. Most conflicts and disagreements are readily resolved at the PF leader and the USMC squad leader level where rapport and close relationship is mandatory. A joint weekly meeting is held by the district chief and the combined action company commander which is attended by all CAP leaders, US and PF. The purpose of the meeting is to review activities, develop future plans and resolve any outstanding problems.

(b) There can be a tendency for the USMC squad leader to assume control of the CAP, particularly if the PF leader is untrained or weak in leadership. While the short term benefits may be desirable, such a condition will negate some of the CAP efforts and goals.

(c) As previously pointed out, US elements working so closely with the people provide many advantages but can also pose problems. Serious incidents involving US forces and the populace can undo the efforts and gains previously made. Indeed, community relations is high on the list of skills required by the CAP infantryman.

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(d) Language barriers create problems of a relatively minor nature. Constant association soon produces a common vocabulary of both English and Vietnamese. It may take longer to get a point across but understanding is achieved.

(9) Comment.

(a) CAPs have provided a type model for sustained, integrated operations with territorial forces. This technique has proven to be effective and economical.

(b) US personnel selection and training is critical to the success of the CAP mission. Personnel who cannot adapt or relate to the conditions should be reassigned.

(c) Every effort should be made to increase the PF responsibility and leadership capability.

b. The Combined Unit Pacification Program (CUPP). Another technique employed by US combat forces in support of territorial security is the Americal Division's CUPP. The CUPP was developed from the experience and basic principles of the CAP.

(1) Concept. The basic concept of the CUPP is to divide an infantry company into platoon or squad-sized elements and combine these elements with a PF platoon to operate in the area of hamlets targeted for pacification. Hamlets are selected by the province chief in coordination with the US commander who provides the infantry unit. This insures overall unity of effort and retention of unit integrity. The US unit remains in the area until the territorial forces can assume full responsibility for security.

(2) Organization. One company per battalion is normally assigned the primary mission of pacification. The remaining companies conduct military operations. The CUPP is being implemented in two phases. The first phase is the combining of one US platoon with one RF/PF platoon. During the second phase, as experience is gained, the company breaks down into reinforced squad elements to combine with PF platoons. Each squad is augmented with one medic and one interpreter.

(3) Mission. The primary mission of the CUPP is to provide security for the population in its AO. Specific missions for the CUPP closely parallel those of the CAP.

(4) Operations. Initially, the CUPP establishes an operating base in coordination with the PF. Bunkers are constructed, wire is laid and fields of fire cleared. From this base, US and PF

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forces conduct combined night patrols and ambushes. As the security of the area is increased, less reliance is placed on the operating base and the combined forces move into a more mobile posture. Concurrent with combat operations, the CUPP element provides military training for the PF. When the PF platoon is well trained or requires only refresher training, the infantry squads then assist in training the local PSDF. The CUPP provides models and standards for the PF to pattern their own organization, tactics and leadership traits. CUPP operations also include support of the Chieu Hoi program by assisting the GVN agencies in dissemination of PSYOPS information through tapes, loudspeakers and responsive leaflet drops.

(5) Command and Control. The US and PF elements operate on a mutual cooperation and coordination basis. The infantry company commander establishes liaison with the district chief and is collocated with district headquarters whenever feasible. Operational control of the CUPP unit is retained at battalion level.

(6) Training for US Personnel. Training for the CUPP program is conducted in coordination with the Marine CAF. Key officers and NCOs attend the Marine CAF school at Danang for a period of two weeks. Some personnel are placed with CAF teams for OJT and finally, CAPs provide Marine advisors during initial stages of CUPP operations. All personnel receive two days of training and orientation on their mission. One day of training is devoted to "personal response" consisting of instruction on Vietnamese religions, customs, history and guidelines for understanding the Vietnamese people. On the second day, the Province Senior Advisor and the Phoenix representative provide a four hour orientation on village/hamlet organization, history of the area and the details of VC/VCI operations by Marine CAP personnel.

(7) Results. The Americal's CUPP was initiated with one company in October 1969 and although the CUPP is a relatively new program, results have been encouraging. Refugees have returned to their homes and security ratings of targeted hamlets have been raised. One operation was so successful that the CUPP element was withdrawn from a targeted hamlet after three months. The PF platoon no longer required the US presence.

(8) Problem Areas. With the CAP experience to draw upon, the CUPP problems have been minimal. However, concepts and variations are still being tested.

(9) Comment.

(a) The technique of combining combat assets with territorial forces on a permanent basis has proved to be effective.

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(b) Originally, the CUPP Company was to be assigned for a period of five to six months. Thus, a thorough knowledge of the terrain, the people and the PF unit could be attained. However, one battalion now rotates its companies through the target hamlets on a monthly basis. This method provides more US soldiers with an awareness of the program, its goals and methodology. It also could prevent a tendency for the US combat soldier to go "stale". The advantages of rotation have not been fully ascertained but it appears that the minimum period for this type of mission is one month.

(c) The transition from bush operations to a pacification mission is not easy. As one company commander remarked, "A period of adjustment is necessary". The inherently slow pace of pacification and lack of immediate measurable results is at times frustrating to the US soldier.

(d) The precipitant withdrawal of US forces from the program could have an adverse effect on both the PF and the local population. Overdependence on US forces and their combat support by the territorial forces should be minimized in the event of untimely withdrawal.

(e) The minimum training afforded the CUPP soldiers requires a high level of unit leadership and continuous motivation toward the GVN pacification goals.

c. The 173d Airborne Brigade and Operation WASHINGTON GREEN.

(1) Concept. Operation WASHINGTON GREEN, initiated in early 1969, was one of the earliest comprehensive pacification operations conducted by the US Army. WASHINGTON GREEN was unusual in that almost all of the 173d Abn Bde's assets were devoted to the pacification effort. The absence of major main force enemy elements in the brigade AO made this commitment possible. While WASHINGTON GREEN embraced all the goals of the pacification plan, emphasis was placed on the provision of territorial security and the bringing of the population under GVN control.

(2) Principles of Planning and Execution.

(a) The focal point of detailed planning and operations was at the district level.

(b) Each battalion's operational boundary would coincide with district boundaries, thus facilitating coordination and clearance of supporting fires.

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(c) The principle of collocation of US battalion tactical headquarters with the district headquarters was emphasized. In addition, battalion S 2s and S 3s were located with the District Intelligence and Operations Coordination Center (DIOCC) and district Tactical Operations Center (TOC), respectively.

(d) Target hamlets were selected in coordination with the district chief and by using the district pacification plan.

(e) Combined RF/PF and US security elements were assigned to targeted AOs and to remain until pacification goals were achieved.

(f) An intensive campaign to orient the troops on the new mission was conducted at all levels in the brigade.

(3) Operations.

(a) With the selection of target hamlets, the brigade moved in and "cleared" the area. Brigade and RF/PF elements deployed around the hamlet to establish a security screen so that Rural Development Cadre and local leaders could begin basic pacification programs. Local RF and PSDF were recruited and trained with US assistance. Once these forces were able to accomplish their mission the US forces moved to the next target hamlet.

(b) The brigade employs the saturation concept for area security with one battalion deployed in 26 separate locations. From these positions, intensive patrolling and ambushing are conducted. Initially, operations are combined with complete integration of US and PF soldiers. As the PF proficiency increases, operations become joint and then finally unilateral with necessary US assistance.

(c) Security Training Assistance Group (STAG) Teams. Recognizing the need for continuing security, the brigade developed a special force called STAG teams. Initially, these teams were organized to train the newly organized PSDF in basic military skills. The STAG team consists of six personnel: a team and assistant team chief, two instructors, a medic and an interpreter. The program of instruction requires 40-50 hours training on marksmanship, weapon care and cleaning, patrol/ambush techniques and guard duties. As the PSDF becomes trained and overall security increases, the STAGs remain in the area conducting hunter-killer operations with RF/PF elements. This allows for the reduction of other US security forces while still maintaining the US presence.

(4) Results. The results and successes of WASHINGTON GREEN have been impressive. The comprehensive commitment to the GVN pacification goals has been unique and has resulted in greatly improved

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hamlet security and RF/PF capability. Success of this US unit's pacification operations is basically the result of:

- (a) Planning, involving all US/GVN agencies in a coordinated effort, guided by the district pacification plan.
- (b) Increased effectiveness of RF/PF and PSDF, accomplished through constant association and combined operations with US elements.
- (c) Gaining the confidence and trust of the people.

(5) Comment.

(a) WASHINGTON GREEN is a long and continuing program. The main force enemy threat often influences the pace of pacification and plans should be flexible and adaptable.

(b) A high degree of leadership and discipline is required by the small unit leader when working with the RF/PF. As results may be spasmodic, patience and understanding become virtues of importance. The best leaders should be chosen for this assignment as a high degree of rapport is necessary to obtain maximum results. One young sergeant explained how he and the PF leader worked out their plans, "Oh, we just sit down and talk it over and keep talking until we agree. Sometimes he gives a little, sometimes I give a little."

(c) The brigade experience is that there is a tendency for the population to rely heavily on the US presence, without particular regard for the size of the element. Thus, it is important to transfer this trust to the local forces by raising the confidence level of the people in the abilities of their RF/PF.

d. 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) and Operation RANDOLF GLEN, 7 December 1969 - 31 March 1970.

(1) Concept. Operation RANDOLF GLEN was a radical departure from the normal US divisional effort in Vietnam in that the total energy and resources of a division were devoted to assisting in the pacification and development of a province. The division, in coordination with ARVN, was committed to provide a protective shield for the populated areas and to support the accomplishments of the goals of the 1970 pacification and development plan.

(2) Training Programs. While operation RANDOLF GLEN covered all of the pacification goals, a noteworthy achievement in the area of territorial security was the upgrading of territorial forces through training and the conduct of combined operations. The division accomplished this by two methods, the use of dedicated battalions and mobile

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training teams.

(a) Dedicated Battalions. The division "dedicated" two of its battalions, each to a separate district, to support RF company training and combat operations. Each battalion headquarters is collocated with the district Tactical Operations Center (TOC). The district chief designates all units selected for training, based on the greatest need. Rather than a lock-step training cycle, the district chief, the district senior advisor, the battalion commander and the company commander jointly develop a training schedule tailored to the specific requirements of the RF company. Training is conducted using equipment on hand and authorized for issue. The effectiveness of this program was exemplified by a recent combined airmobile operation of two RF companies with US units operating for an extended period in the brigade operations zone. RF companies from other districts are rotated through the dedicated battalions, thus extending the battalions' influence throughout the province.

(b) Mobile Training Teams (MTTs). The division has organized MTTs to extend its training capability to areas where it normally does not operate. Working with the district chief and the district advisor, the teams train PF and PSDF elements. Training is designed to correct weaknesses and raise individual skills required for specific missions. MTTs are composed of one officer/NCO, two enlisted instructors, one radio operator, one medic and a Kit Carson Scout/interpreter.

1 In keeping with the division's particular capability, the training teams have advanced beyond the basic military subjects for PF and are including airmobile operations in the program. This includes the basics of LZ selection, employment of control teams and fire support coordination.

2 Training schedules are flexible and adapted to the local situation. For example, one team trains for only half a day because of the rice harvest season.

(3) Results. Definite improvement was noted in the combat effectiveness of territorial forces which operated with and received training from division elements. RF/PF units have demonstrated an improved capability by extending the scope and range of their operations, but most importantly, a new willingness and spirit has been evident.

(4) Problems. No major problems have been encountered but certain areas require improvement: There is a need for additional qualified interpreters; insufficient weapons cleaning material and repair parts in the RVNAF supply system; and training facilities are

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inadequate.

(5) Comment. It was learned that the responsiveness of RF/PF/PSDF improved when the training programs adapted to local customs and habits. When possible, training should be conducted in an area convenient to the homes of most soldiers. Allowance should be made for a long meal break since time is required for meal preparation.

e. Coordination at the Village Level. One of the aims of the 1970 pacification program is to enhance the prestige and authority of the village chief. Working through the US advisor and the district chief, commanders should include the village chief and his staff in pacification planning.

5. (C) Combined Operations--An Example. The following paragraphs describe a particularly successful campaign involving the 1st Bn, 502d Inf, 101st Abn Div and the district forces of Quang Dien District, northwest of Hue. This success was achieved not by contacts with major forces or large-scale cordon operations, but rather by the less dramatic day-to-day execution of a harmonious and well-integrated US/Vietnamese campaign. The campaign lasted six months and resulted in the virtual elimination of VC influence from the district.

a. Destruction of Organized Resistance. Security conditions in the district were indeed grim with NVA/VC units almost completely controlling the area. After a period of difficult combat operations the district was cleared of major organized resistance. The stage was then set to secure the area and begin the process of pacification.

b. RF/PF. The major task at hand was the elimination of the local VC and the VCI. The battalion early recognized the critical role the RF/PF would play in the accomplishment of the mission and set out to utilize their potential. The RF/PF soldier had a knowledge of the terrain, the people and their habits the battalion could not duplicate. The RF/PF soldier had much to offer and the US forces found him to be a reliable and effective fighting ally. A key factor in the success of combined operations was the battalion's sympathetic recognition and understanding of the RF/PF characteristics and capabilities and the sincere desire to not only foster increased responsibility but to deliberately and conscientiously assist in training these forces and improving their overall proficiency.

c. Collocation of Command Posts. A firm foundation for future cooperation was established from the start as the battalion set up its CP in the same compound occupied by the district headquarters.

The battalion's area of operations and the district boundary generally coincided and the collocation greatly facilitated the exchange of information and the conduct of combined planning and operations. The compound contained the district military and administrative staffs, the operations center, police headquarters and the MACV advisory staff. Thus, all the machinery to plan and control operations was contained in a very small area. Planning could be readily coordinated, changes quickly implemented and intelligence made immediately available to both forces. This arrangement threw the two staffs into constant contact creating a close and warm relationship that otherwise would not have been possible. In examining the daily operations for the period, the unique degree of close, continuous cooperation between the US and district forces is apparent. The mutual esteem and close rapport existing between the two commanders were reflected in the habitually harmonious operations of their forces.

d. Planning. The initial planning for the next day's operations took place at a 1900 hours meeting attended by the battalion commander, the district chief, their respective S 2s and S 3s and the district advisor. Based on intelligence and operational objectives, the detailed operations of each US company and RF/PF unit were worked out--the scheme of maneuver of combined forces, how and where they would link up, logistic requirements and communication coordination. This same close liaison also existed for unilateral operations. A routine was established whereby all unit locations and ambush sites were posted to the operations maps of both the battalion and the district.

e. Combined Operations. Operations were grouped into three general types.

(1) Initially, when enemy resistance was still formidable, RF/PF elements normally linked up early in the morning with the US troops--usually a RF/PF platoon with each US company. Link up generally took place in a secure area from where the combined force moved out on its mission. The RF/PF were usually deployed with the forward elements of the US force where their knowledge of terrain and their skill at detecting booby traps and bunkers could be best utilized. When operating with a US unit, the RF/PF received the same support as US troops--rations, water, medical support and ammunition.

(2) As experience with US forces increased, the commitment of RF/PF to tactical maneuver against the enemy became more prevalent. The combat assault with various combinations of US district forces became routine. Normally, RF/PF elements constituted the combat assault and maneuvered toward US forces positioned as blocking forces.

(3) The final type of combined operation was one in which the RF/PF conducted an independent combat assault and ground operations while

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the US provided only the required lift. As the RF/PF competence and confidence increased, this type of operation became commonplace.

(4) By the district chief accompanying the battalion commander in the command and control chopper, parallel communication channels were in use. This provided for control of all elements and permitted a rapid adjustment in plans if necessary.

(5) Thus, as the VC structure in the district weakened, a change in combined operations took place. Initially, RF/PF forces operated as small elements within a larger US force. Gradually, as RF/PF proficiency increased, they operated as company or platoon elements within a combined force, and eventually independent operations supported only by US helicopters.

f. Results. The increased effectiveness of RF/PF units and the deteriorating VC strength soon permitted the US battalion to redeploy to another area of operations. Security throughout the district was provided by the RF/PF. US/RF/PF combat operations had clearly provided the environment in which total pacification could be undertaken.

g. Comment. In the planning for and conduct of combined operations, US units have learned the following general lessons.

(1) Supply. Most RF companies do not have adequate supplies for extended operations. In particular, units usually lack sufficient claymore mines, grenades, trip and hand flares and M-79 illumination rounds. Lack of a responsive resupply system tends to restrict the length of combined operations.

(2) Training.

(a) The experience of some US units revealed that the training period for the US/RF company involved in combined/integrated operations should be about 15 days. Seven days was found to be too brief for the average company.

(b) As a means to bolster the confidence of local units operating with US forces a two day "break-in" period was initiated following the training period. The break-in consisted of operations in an area where contact was not likely to occur. This enabled US and RF units to iron out problems and polish their operational techniques.

(c) Orientation of US troops on the nature of combined operations is a necessity. The RF/PF organization and its capabilities, strengths and weaknesses, should be explained. Concurrently, the US commander should ensure the Vietnamese receive a similar indoctrination with explanations as to why the US forces are there and what the combination of forces can expect to accomplish.

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(d) The lack of technically qualified interpreters impedes RF/PF training on technical subjects such as weapon systems and mortars.

(3) Command and Control. All decisions on operations from the lowest maneuver element to the staff should be mutually agreed upon.

6. (C) Neutralization of the Viet Cong Infrastructure (VCI).

a. General. Although the anti-VCI program is primarily a Vietnamese operation, US combat forces have made and continue to make valuable contributions to the neutralization of the VCI. US units provide support, special assistance, intelligence data and conduct anti-VCI operations in coordination with GVN agencies. The lessons and experiences of some US units engaged in this aspect of pacification follow:

b. The Province/District Intelligence and Operations Coordinating Centers (PIOCC/DIOCC).

(1) The PIOCC/DIOCC serves as the central point of information and coordination of operations against the VCI. Its membership consists of all the intelligence gathering agencies in the area (the National Police, the military, the Rural Development Cadre and others). The center collects and collates information. Operations are then planned on the basis of available intelligence.

(2) The US provides (under the Phoenix Program) advisors to most PIOCC/DIOCCs. They assist their counterparts in the collection and exploitation of VCI intelligence. The US advisor serves as a valuable point of contact and coordination for US units engaged in anti-VCI operations.

(3) The PIOCC/DIOCC is an essential source of VCI information and can provide the US unit with such items as Lists of Communist Offenders (LOCO), detailed hamlet maps showing locations and occupants of houses, and photographs. US tactical units in turn should provide the centers with US generated intelligence and resources for their mutual benefit.

(4) Rapid and thorough interrogation of captured VCI members is one of the best sources on which to base operations. This information and captured documents should be made available to the DIOCC. On occasion, a US unit has bypassed the DIOCC resulting in lost opportunities for the immediate exploitation of perishable intelligence. As a policy, tactical units should provide copies of all captured documents, interrogation reports and lists of detained or suspected VCI to the appropriate GVN agency.

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(5) Experience has proven the value of coordination with the centers and many commanders, as a matter of policy, provide full time liaison officers to the PIOCC/DIOCCs. Where resources and distance preclude this, frequent liaison visits and continuous communication should be established as a minimum.

c. US Support for the DIOCC. The 1st Infantry Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (mech) found that some DIOCCs in its area of operations were not functioning at their full potential. As a result, the brigade formed a special team from its military intelligence detachment to work with the US advisors and the DIOCCs. Consisting of one warrant officer, one order of battle and one interrogation specialist, the team's mission was two-fold--first, to coordinate intelligence operations between brigade maneuver battalions and the DIOCC, and second, to assist in the establishment of a viable and effective DIOCC capable of actively engaging in counter-VCI operations. As appropriate, the team initiates a system of card files to assist in identifying and tracing VC/VCI suspects and to supplement the LOCO. This file is integrated with a grid square card system created to record all incidents, contacts, sightings and agent reports within a particular area and thus facilitate the analysis of VC/VCI activity patterns. The utilization of the brigade special team has stimulated and renewed GVN interest in anti-VCI operations.

d. Lists of Communist Offenders. The VCI LOCO is a very useful tool in the elimination of the infrastructure; however, the compilation of a LOCO is a demanding task in that it requires the consolidation of massive amounts of information from many sources. The main problem is keeping the list current. Experience has shown that LOCO usually fall into a state of uselessness unless they receive constant attention. In order to maintain viable LOCOs, the 1st Infantry Division found that it was necessary to establish a LOCO VCI Target Group, whose primary function was to maintain surveillance over all VCI name inputs from all sources. This group would also participate in the interrogation of prisoners and Hoi Chanhhs. The interrogation included a name-by-name run through the LOCO. This was found to be a profitable way to update the list and to account for VCI who may have been killed by indirect fire. This technique uncovered the fact that a high VCI party member had been killed in an air strike and that a district official was a prisoner. Up-to-date lists provide a basis for pinpointing district VCI operational areas and facilitate US counter-operations.

e. Cordon and Search.

(1) The most extensive use of US forces in the anti-VCI program has been in the conduct of cordon and search operations. The role of US

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units is normally to provide the cordon, in whole or in part, while the search and screening process is conducted by RVNAF and/or GVN agencies. The tactical fundamentals of cordon and search operations have been widely disseminated (USMACV Lessons Learned No. 75 is an excellent source of information on procedures and types of operations). The following paragraphs outline pertinent techniques, experiences and note the operational changes in cordon and search missions.

(2) In the past, cordon and search operations have been extremely successful due to the large numbers of VC/VCI interspersed among the populace. The very success of these and other anti-VCI operations have reduced the VCI in many areas to the point where cordon and search for US forces is becoming less lucrative and even marginally effective, considering the assets expended. In some cases the results did not offset the loss of some pro-GVN sympathy and support.

(3) When considering a cordon and search operation, the commander should weigh the possible gain against the utilization of his forces in other tactical roles. Operations should be conducted only upon accurate, reliable and timely intelligence. When planning for a cordon and search operation, consideration should be given the following factors in order to mitigate the possible antagonism of the pro-GVN populace.

(a) Provide US representation with the search force for coordination and to help insure that the people are treated with respect and their property safeguarded.

(b) Duration of the operation should be as brief as possible, consistent with the objectives.

(c) Minimize the disruption to hamlet and economic activities.

(d) US forces to be as inconspicuous as the situation will permit.

(4) The 25th Infantry Division developed a variation of the standard cordon and search using the technique of "air cordon and search". This method normally involves the use of ten helicopter "slicks" plus observation/gunships and is usually carried out as a combined operation with RF/PF and National Police.

(a) The tactic is for five slicks to land as close to the target area as possible. The search elements then move through the hamlet. The observation/gunships provide surveillance and dispatch the remaining slicks to block exit routes of potential escapees.

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(b) On the ground, search and interrogation are made more effective by the use of a specially created VCI Exploitation Team composed of four to six ex-VCI who have rallied and become Kit Carson Scouts. Former residents of the targeted area, the scouts contribute to the success of the mission by providing detailed planning information, by assisting in identification of suspected VCI and by pointing out likely hiding places for weapons and personnel.

(c) The major advantage of the air cordon and search is the speed and security with which the operation is carried out. This method, however, is limited in application to well defined housing clusters in areas where there is good visibility from the air.

(5) One lesson the 101st Airborne Division learned in cordon and search is that there is a tendency for operations to become stereotyped and predictable in pattern. Operations which frequently begin at about the same time and follow the same sequence result in a decreased probability of snaring the VCI. Increased effectiveness has resulted from varying the operation as much as possible.

7. (C) Civic Action.

a. General. US military civic action supports the GVN Pacification and Development Plan, 1970 goal of "Prosperity for All" which includes economic development and improved social, health and education conditions. Of the pacification goals, civic action has perhaps involved more US forces in the pacification process than any other activity in Vietnam. The concept of civic action is not new to US forces but the magnitude and diversity of the effort in Vietnam is indeed new. The catalogue of US military civic action programs and projects is almost limitless and the techniques and methods used are innumerable and the success of these efforts is visible throughout Vietnam. Rather than provide a list of individual techniques, this paragraph will outline the fundamental lessons learned (and re-learned), and the principles to be used in applying civic action to the overall mission.

b. Objectives. The basic objectives of civic action operations are to:

(1) Demonstrate a concern for the welfare of the people in order to gain their support, loyalty and respect.

(2) Develop the potential and capability of the community and the individual to help themselves.

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(3) Improve the living condition of the people, thereby alleviating some of the underlying causes of insurgency.

(4) Increase the influence of the GVN and improve its image in the eyes of the people.

c. Concept. The most critical aspect of the civic action concept is, coordination. It is the thread that holds the fabric of effective military civic action together and is a reoccurring theme. The concept also requires that all projects be consistent with and compliment the Pacification and Development Plan and that projects meet the following criteria.

(1) Project is desired and needed by the people.

(2) The GVN is unable to provide the required resources.

(3) People are willing to participate in the project and to help themselves.

(4) Local/GVN resources are available to maintain or staff constructed facilities.

d. Development of US Unit Civic Action Programs.

(1) All unit civic action programs are in support of the Province Pacification and Development Plan. It is at the province level that all plans and projects are coordinated. The province establishes a civic action priority list as developed from US/GVN proposals and requests.

(2) The make-up of the priority list begins at the hamlet level. If the project meets the unit's criteria and capability, it is forwarded to the village for approval and consolidation. This sequence is followed up to province level. Thus an approved province project would have the concurrence of the village chief, the battalion commander, the district senior advisor, the district chief, the brigade/division commander, the province senior advisor and the province chief. This process assures efficient allocation of resources and that US military civic action efforts support GVN pacification objectives rather than compete with them. The province priority list is a "directory" for US unit participation in civic action.

(3) Unilateral action and lack of coordination and planning, for example, have resulted in a well constructed, but unused classrooms-- a testimony to a wasted investment.

e. Analysis of the Area.

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(1) Many commanders have found that a detailed indepth analysis of the area is an invaluable aid in understanding the needs of the area. While there is a certain uniformity of strengths and weaknesses, each hamlet, village and district has its own peculiar set of problem areas and vulnerabilities.

(2) Much demographic, economic and political data is usually available from GVN agencies. Often, however, data are incomplete or out of date due to dynamic shifts in population and economic conditions and many benefits can accrue as a result of area studies. One S 5's detailed analysis discovered one cause of a village's reluctance to develop an improvement program. The local political structure was almost equally divided into two factions. Progress was at a standstill since neither party could muster the necessary leadership. The introduction of a third party, agreeable to both factions, allowed civic action projects to proceed.

(3) The civic action officer can also enlist the services of the staff in developing his program. The S 1 can provide a list of personnel whose skills, special talents and hobbies could be utilized in planned projects. The S 2 can provide PSYOP resources to motivate the people and publicize the activity.

f. Execution Guidelines for Civic Action Programs.

(1) "Do not make commitments prior to appropriate approval. Broken promises create disillusionment and a credibility gap." One village chief remarked that three surveys had been made to fill the village's educational needs and he was unaware of what action was being taken.

(2) Maximize GVN credit for the project to emphasize the concern of the government for the people. The US should maintain a stance of modesty and remain in the background as much as possible.

(3) Maintain continuous liaison and coordination with CORDS advisors.

(4) All support should be provided through the US advisor to local government officials. Support is normally restricted to materials, skill and equipment not available through GVN sources.

g. Medical Civic Action Program (MEDCAP).

(1) The MEDCAP has been highly successful in bringing medical support to large segments of the population not previously exposed to modern medical care. In the early stages of the program there was duplication of effort and infrequency of service resulting from the many dislocations of US units. As the combat situation stabilized,

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units have brought MEDCAP under more centralized control and made provision for continuing care.

(2) One brigade has established a comprehensive medical program which has as its objective the permanent improvement in GVN health agencies so that they attain medical self-sufficiency. Working with the province medicine chief, the brigade surgeon coordinates his medical capability with the province medical objectives. Monthly MEDCAP schedules are then established to efficiently allocate the medical resources. Where possible, MEDCAPs are held at GVN medical facilities on a combined basis at the GVN dispensary or health station.

(3) This unit has also established an informal training program in its role as medical consultant and supporter of GVN medical self-sufficiency. The program, organized into four phases, provides guidance and diagnostic training to the GVN nurse and health worker at the GVN medical facility.

(a) Phase I. The physician and his team provide close supervision and detailed instruction to upgrade the skill and proficiency of personnel.

(b) Phase II. Increasing responsibility is placed on the nurse/health worker for screening, diagnosing and dispensing the required medical care. Only nominal supervision and guidance are provided.

(c) Phase III. This consists of periodic visits to insure that the desired level of proficiency, cleanliness and care is maintained.

(d) Phase IV. Upon determination that the medical facility and its personnel are considered capable, further assistance is terminated. The province medicine chief and the brigade surgeon jointly concur in the termination.

(4) The brigade has also instituted a policy of providing US medical supplies/equipment only in case of emergency or acute shortage. The extensive use of US material tends to subvert the GVN supply system and often places in the hands of GVN medical personnel drugs/equipment which they are ill-prepared to handle.

h. Civic Action in Support of the Chieu Hoi Program. Some units of II Field Force Vietnam are directly supporting the Chieu Hoi program through civic action projects. The use of MEDCAPs at Chieu Hoi centers demonstrates a concern for the rallier and evidences a promise kept. Civic action support is also provided in areas where the ministry

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of Chieu Hoi cannot provide funds by supplying captured and excess foodstuffs, improving housing and recreational facilities, and providing material for vocational training and rehabilitation. Seabee construction units have been particularly active in assisting the returnee program. Vocational training programs have been established to develop and improve skills such as masonry, welding and heavy equipment operations.

i. Roads. The importance to an agrarian economy of farm-to-market roads has long been recognized. The Romans, two thousand years ago, appreciated that the key to waging successful war and to pacification was to have an efficient road system. Apart from their military uses, good roads are a unifying factor and an economic necessity. No other civic action project captures the imagination and interest of the people and the local government as does road building or improvement. This interest extends from the individual villager to the province chief. Commanders should consider their allocation of resources and priorities in light of the importance of these rural lines of communication.

8. (C) General Comments on the Pacification Mission.

a. Redeployment/Withdrawal.

(1) Provision for the assumption of all pacification and development tasks and security functions being performed by US units must be coordinated with the relieving unit. Where military civic action programs (MILCAP) and medical civic action programs exist, the local people become accustomed to visits from these teams. The redeploying unit should do its utmost to insure continuation of these programs. Where the relieving unit is an RVNAF unit, it should be strongly urged to continue meaningful MILCAP and MEDCAP. Projects which are underway should not be abandoned as there is likely to be an unfavorable psychological and material impact.

(2) Redeployment plans at all echelons should include a CORDS annex listing programs, their status, and points of contact with leaders of the civilian community. Supplies and materials not retrograded can be channeled into ongoing projects or be used to finish projects not completed prior to redeployment. A "turnover" file facilitates assumption of project responsibility by units remaining in the area and should include the background, status, and location of materials for each project. Also included should be Civil Affairs activities which require continuing assistance, such as scholarship programs, and English classes.

b. Boundaries. Whenever the tactical situation permits, tactical boundaries of US units in support of pacification should be made to coincide with Vietnamese political boundaries. Coordination,

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clearance of fires and the overall conduct of pacification is thereby facilitated. The enemy is of course aware of firing restrictions associated with the boundaries and takes advantage of them. However, a technique to discourage this "fence riding" is to periodically extend boundaries after mutual coordination in adjacent areas. In areas where it is not tactically feasible to establish coincident boundaries US liaison teams organized at province and district level have proved to be invaluable in providing a communication and coordination link between US and GVN agencies for the conduct of all phases of pacification.

c. Formal Training for RVNAF. In addition to training provided the territorial forces by US units through combined and integrated operations, most US brigades and divisions sponsor a variety of formal schools. Courses range from a one week course in mine detection to a one month RF officer leadership course. These courses contribute in great measure to the upgrading of territorial forces and therefore pacification.

d. Personal Conduct of US Forces. All of the efforts expended by the US toward pacification can be negated through thoughtless or ill-advised action on the part of US troops. Many units establish and place command emphasis on Personal Response Programs. These programs are designed to provide an appreciation and understanding of the Vietnamese and his culture. In the final analysis, ordinary courtesy and respect for an individual's rights greatly increase the prospects for a successful pacification mission.

9. (C) Summary of Lessons Learned.

a. General. US combat forces are designed, organized, trained and equipped to conduct combat operations. The successful adaptation of these forces to the pacification role has proven the flexibility of US combat personnel and their organizations. The complexity of the pacification effort and a need for the orchestration of associated tasks has been one of the most significant lessons learned. Other lessons, by area, are summarized below.

b. Territorial Security and Upgrading of Territorial Forces.

US combat forces have developed special organizations adapted to the pacification mission of providing sustained territorial security. The use of these forces has materially assisted in the improvement of security and has demonstrated to the villager the US/GVN concern for his well-being.

(1) The combining and integration of US and local forces, associated with these special organizations, has proven to be an economical use of forces. Through this association, the capability

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of territorial forces has improved out of proportion to the US forces assigned.

(2) Prior to implementation of a similar integrated program, commanders should be selective in the designation of small unit leaders and provide special training for them. Troops should receive intensive orientation on the mission and a understanding and appreciation of the territorial soldier and his culture. The Vietnamese leader and his troops should also receive similar instruction on the US organization and soldier. Incompatible personnel, US or Vietnamese, should be re-assigned.

(3) The US elements on sustained integrated operations should strive to upgrade and develop the self-sufficiency of the local forces and to minimize the dependence on US combat support and assistance.

c. Collocation of Command Posts and Operational Centers. Collocation should be achieved whenever possible to facilitate coordination, cooperation, mutual assistance and combined decision making. When collocation is not feasible, liaison should be exchanged between the coordinating elements.

d. Combined Operations with Territorial Forces.

(1) Regional and Popular Forces operate well with US troops after a period of orientation and combined training. Qualified interpreters are often necessary to assist in the instruction on technical subjects and weapons.

(2) US commanders should ascertain the logistic requirements and capabilities of RF/PF units prior to combined operations. Every effort should be made to obtain needed supplies through RVNAF channels.

(3) Detailed prior planning and joint decision making will more readily insure success.

e. Neutralization of VCI. The essence of US support of this pacification goal is close coordination with the PIOCC/DIOCC through the US advisors. Mutual exchange of information and intelligence is required for optimum results. Captured documents and VCI or suspected VCI should be made available to GVN agencies.

f. Cordon and Search Operations. Many cordon and search operations are now becoming less-productive and in some cases contra-productive. US units should engage in cordon and search operations only when the apparent advantages outweigh the disadvantages.

g. Civic Action Programs. US units supporting civic action programs must insure proposed projects meet established criteria and

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conform to the GVN pacification and development plan. All support and assistance should be coordinated through the appropriate US advisor. Projects and programs should be aimed toward self-help and self-sufficiency.

h. Boundaries. Whenever feasible, unit operational boundaries should coincide with political boundaries to facilitate not only supporting fire coordination but all pacification operations. The political divisions in Vietnam frequently do not lend themselves well to the establishment of similar AOs and in such cases the commander should provide liaison.

i. Coordination. The last but one of the most important lessons in pacification is the requirement for liaison and coordination. The primary channel of communication in this regard is through the MACV/CORDS advisor. The advisor provides the tactical commander with a valuable source of information and experience for pacification operations.

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2 - Pres, Naval War College	2 - COMDT, USA Jungle Warfare Sch
1 - Supt, USNPGS	1 - CINCEUR
2 - COMDT, USN Amph Sch	10 - CINCUSAREUR
2 - CO, NAVPHIBSCOL, CORO	2 - CG, 7th US Army
1 - CO, BOATSUPPU ONE	2 - CINCSTRIKE
1 - CO, Beach Jumper UNIT ONE	4 - HQ USAFSTRIKE
1 - CO, Beach Jumper UNIT TWO	2 - CINCSOUTH
1 - CO, BSU-TWO	15 - US ARMY FORCES, SOUTHCOM
1 - CO, UDT-TWENTY ONE	2 - USA School of Americas
1 - CO, UDT-TWENTY TWO	
3 - CO, Seal Tm 1	
3 - CO, Seal Tm 2	
2 - CO, Naval Inshore Ops Tng Cen	
1 - PAC Msl Range	
1 - CO, Naval Wpns Cen	
1 - COM NAV Const Bn	
2 - Supt, USAFA	
1 - 463 TAC Airlift Wg	
1 - Aero Systems Div (ASBEE-10)	
2 - AU Library	
5 - Dept of Air Police Tng	
3 - Hq Aero Sys Div (AFSC)	
3 - HQ For Tech Div, AFSC	
1 - Air Tng Comd (ATOPT-S)	
1 - Dir, Special Air Warfare Sch	
10 - 479th Tac Ftr Wg	
1 - 3636 Cmbt Crew Tng Gp (CCT-OT)	
2 - Armt Dev & Test Cen (ADFS)	
2 - Fld Tng Det (TDBAS-2)	
1 - General Research Corp	
2 - CG, Marine Corps Base, Cp Pendleton	
2 - CG, Marine Corps Base, Cp Lejeune	
2 - CG, Marine Corps Recruit Depot, San Diego	
2 - CH, Marine Corps Recruit Depot, Parris Island	
5 - CG, FMF, LANT	
5 - CG, FMF, PAC	
1 - CO, Landing Force Tng Comd, Pac	
1 - COMPHIBTRAPAC	
2 - CG, Marine Corps Dev & Ed Comd	
8 - CINCAL	
14 - CG, USARAL	
6 - CINCLANT	
5 - CINCLANTFLT	
3 - COMPHIBLANT	
3 - COMPHIBTRALANT	

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2	30 Mar 62	Airmobile Operation in I Corps
3	11 Apr 62	Operation JUNGLE JIM
4	11 Apr 62	Ranger Task Force Operation in Vinh Binh Sector
5	11 Apr 62	Multi-Battalion Operation in Northern Tay Ninh Province
6	11 Apr 62	Operations in Phuoc Thanh Sector to Relocate Civilians
7	18 Apr 62	Operation DAN TIEN VIII
8	23 Apr 62	Operation CA CHEP
9	27 Apr 62	Operation in Kien Hoa Sector
10	1 May 62	VC Ambush-Trung Lap, Binh Duong Province
11	5 May 62	Operation TIGER HUNT
12	10 May 62	Operation RAINDROP
13	16 May 62	Operation NGUYEN HUE
14	Undated	Operation SON CA
15	15 Jun 62	Ambush Techniques
16	19 Jun 62	Review of Lessons Learned 1 - 15
17	25 Jun 62	Techniques Dealing with Airmobile Assaults
18	24 Jul 62	Tips and Combat Experiences
19	31 Jul 62	Operation SUNRISE
20	27 Aug 62	Indiscriminate Use of Firepower

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21	28 Aug 62	Ambush Techniques
22	8 Sep 62	Operations of US Army Helicopters
23	5 Oct 62	Operation BINH TAY
24	13 Nov 62	Airmobile Raids Against Superior Forces
25	17 Dec 62	Search Techniques
26	18 Jan 63	M113 Operations
27	28 Feb 63	Ambushes
28	18 Apr 63	Guidelines for Advisors
29	17 May 63	Ambush in BINH CHANH
30	17 Aug 63	Psywar and Civic Action Operations
31	27 Sep 63	Artillery Organization & Employment in Counterinsurgency
32	19 Oct 63	Eagle Flight Operations
33	29 Oct 63	Utilization of Military Dogs
34	30 Nov 63	Railway Security
35	10 Jan 64	Clear and Hold Operations
36	4 Feb 64	Free and Maneuver
37	10 Feb. 64	Vehicle Convoy Organization and Control
38	12 Mar 64	Area Saturation Operation
39	11 Mar 64	Ambush Operations
40	23 Mar 64	Corps Psywar/CA Operations Center
41	28 Jul 64	Operations of Seabee Technical Assistance Teams
42	7 Oct 64	VC Employment of Land Mines
43	22 Dec 64	Combat Tips I

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45	12 Feb 65	Viet Cong Tunnels
46	3 Mar 65	Recent Operations
47	30 Mar 65	River Assault Group Operations
48	7 Apr 65	Combat Tips II
49	13 Apr 65	Operation HOAI AN
50	13 Apr 65	Naval Conduct of Amphibious Operations
51	24 Apr 65	Operational Employment of Riot Control Munitions
52	22 Nov 65	Operational Employment of the Mity Mite Portable Blower
53	29 Sep 66	Viet Cong Improvised Explosive Mines and Booby Traps
54	27 Jan 66	The Battle of Ky Phu
55	15 Mar 66	The Battle of Annihilation
56	18 Apr 66	Operations Against Tunnel Complexes
57	25 May 66	Pursuit
58	20 Jun 66	Operation HAPPY VALLEY
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62	11 Mar 67	Salient Lessons Learned
63	25 Apr 67	Search and Rescue Operations
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65	20 Oct 67	Population and Resources Control

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66	10 Nov 67	Countermeasures for 102mm, 122mm and 140mm Rockets
67	4 Apr 68	Defense
68	20 Jul 68	Viet Cong Base Camps and Supply Caches
69	10 Sep 68	Analysis of Enemy Positions at Khe Sanh and Evaluation of the Effectiveness of Weapons Systems Against Enemy Fortifications
70	17 Oct 68	Friendly Casualties from Friendly Fires
71	13 Mar 69	Countermeasures Against Standoff Attacks
72	16 Nov 68	Aerospace Rescue and Recovery in South Vietnam
73	20 Nov 68	Defeat of VC Infrastructure
74	15 Sep 69	Accidental Herbicide Damage
75	20 Jan 70	Cordon and Search Operations
76	22 Nov 69	Vietnamization
77	To be Printed	Fire Support Coordination
78	17 Feb 70	Action at Long Khot
79	8 Mar 70	Enemy Exploitation of Allied Tactical Communications

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2-69	29 Jul 69	Tactical Cover and Deception (C & D) in Counterinsurgency Operations.
3-69	7 Sep 69	Task Force Remagen; Experiences with Enemy B-40 and B-41 Rockets; Naval Forces Operations; Bridge Security Against Underwater Sapper Attack.
4-69	3 Nov 69	Bunker Busting/Land Clearing; Sapper Actions of North Vietnam Communists; FAC Operations; KBAR/VAMPIRE Concept; Anti-Rocket Program.
5-69	5 Jan 70	Viet Cong Attack on Regional Force Outpost; Pacification of Quang Dien District.
6-69	15 Jan 70	"To Build, Not to Destroy..." Air Ambush, Surveillance Task Force.
1-70	1 Apr 70	Tactical Cover and Deception.

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